Indonesia hosts a US-led exercise with 4,700 troops, weeks after drilling with China

Indonesia opened Super Garuda Shield on Monday, an annual exercise it has run with the United States for close to two decades. This year it is big: 4,700 soldiers from more than a dozen countries, including Britain, France and Japan, training across sites on Sumatra and Borneo until 11 September. East Timor, Italy and Thailand sent observers. The drills cover special forces infiltration and cyberdefence, and the stated purpose, as the South China Morning Post reports, is to "deter aggression" in the Asia-Pacific. Deterrence here means showing enough combined strength that no one tries anything, rather than planning to fight.

The timing is the story. In August, Indonesia held joint naval drills with China, which Taiwan called a "provocation." Now it is hosting the American side of the same rivalry on its own islands. Jakarta calls this policy "free and active": no foreign bases, no formal military ally, and a readiness to train with everyone. Read from Hong Kong, Tokyo or Washington, it looks less like neutrality and more like careful hedging, and each exercise becomes a small signal about which way the balance is tipping.

The drills also put thousands of foreign soldiers and cyber teams on Indonesian soil for nearly two weeks, which has practical value beyond the symbolism. Commander Patrick Ellis of the US Fourth Infantry Division described the point as "building the human architecture that keeps the Indo-Pacific safe", meaning officers from different armies get to know each other before a crisis instead of during one.

Why it matters

Indonesia is getting training, equipment access and standing out of both sides of a rivalry, and so far neither side has forced it to choose. That is worth something concrete: it keeps defence purchases open in several directions and keeps Indonesia at the table in regional talks. The risk is that hedging stops working when the pressure rises, and the clearest early sign would be a partner asking for something Jakarta cannot give both sides at once, such as basing rights or a public position on Taiwan.