Why Russia cannot shield Indonesia from China at sea

When Prabowo Subianto stood next to Vladimir Putin at an economic forum in Vladivostok in September, a Jakarta Post column read it as Russia returning as a third pole for Indonesia's bebas-aktif, or free and active, foreign policy: a way to depend less on Beijing. Writing for the Lowy Institute, Radityo Dharmaputra of Universitas Airlangga says that idea does not hold up, because Russia leans on China itself. He cites a Carnegie Endowment estimate from September 2025: China takes more than 30 percent of Russia's export earnings, while Russia is worth about 3 percent of China's exports. Moscow has also signed up to Beijing's line that South China Sea disputes should be settled only between the states directly involved.

The test case already happened. The Tuna gas block sits in Indonesia's exclusive economic zone off the Natuna Islands, the belt of sea where one country holds the sole right to the resources, and China claims part of it under its nine-dash line. Zarubezhneft, a Russian state oil company, bought half the block in 2020. When a drilling rig arrived on 30 June 2021, a Chinese coast guard ship reached the site within days and Chinese diplomats demanded that Indonesia stop drilling. Jakarta refused and kept the rig working until November. Half the field was already Russian-owned, and Beijing pressed its claim anyway.

Now the block is being restarted with the same partner. Harbour Energy sold its half to Indonesia's Prime Group in May, and Zarubezhneft said in June it was ready to resume work. The obstacle is money: financing has been hard since the 2022 sanctions on Russia, and on 8 October the United Kingdom added Zarubezhneft to its own sanctions list. Dharmaputra wants the government to check whether that listing cuts Tuna off from loans and insurance, and to use the new foreign minister's first parliamentary hearing to state that the November 2024 joint statement with Xi Jinping on joint development in overlapping claim areas does not cover Tuna.

Why it matters

Tuna gas is meant to help with the fuel and power bills the state keeps struggling to cover, and a block that cannot find finance or insurance produces nothing. The thing to watch is not the handshake in Vladivostok but whether a final investment decision ever arrives. If you assumed Moscow was quiet cover in the North Natuna Sea, this argues the cover is not there, while the sanctions bill is.